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DOUGLAS AmCRAFT

[L. A. No. 26426.

Co.

1'. CRAXSTON

In Bank.

[58 C.2d

Oct. 2, 1962.]

DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff and
Respondent, v. ALAN CRANSTON, as State Controller,
Defendant and Appellant.

)

[1] Eschea.t-Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property ActObjectives.-The objectives of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1500-1527) are to
protect unknown owners by locating them and restoring their
property to them and to give the state rather than the holders
of unclaimed property the benefit of the use of it.
[2] Limitation of Actions-Limitation Laws-Extension of Time.
-An extension of the statutory period within which an action
must be brought is generally valid if made before the causp.
of action is barred; the party claiming to be adversely affected
is deemed to suffer no injury where he WU3 under an obligation
to pay before the period was lengthened, the theory being that
the legislation affects cnly the remedy and not a right.
[3] Id.-Limitation Law&-Extension of Time.-A statute that enlarges a period of limitation applies to matters pending but
not already barred unless the statute expressly provides to the
contrary.
[4] Escheat-Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property ActLimitation of Actions.-Since Code Civ. Proc., § 1515, relating
to the disposition of unclaimed property and providing that
"The expiration of any period of time specified by statute or
court order, during which an action or procepding may be
commenced or enforced to obtain payment of a claim for
money or recovery of property, shall not prevent the money or
property from being presumed abandoned property, nor affect
any duty to file a report •.. or to payor deliver abandoned
property to the State Controller," does not expressly provide
that it shall be retroactive or apply to claims that were already
barred when it was enacted, it must be interpreted as applying
only to claims on which the statute of limitations had not run
on the effective date of the act.
[5] Id.-Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act-Limitation of Actions.-Code Civ. Proc., § 1510, subd. (g), relating
to disposition of unclaimed property and stating what items
of property must be included in the initial report filed with the
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, §§ 5, 6; Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions (1st ed § 29).
McX:. Dig. References: [1,4, 5] Escheat, § 8; [2, 3] Limitation
of Actions, § 6.
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Controller, is expressly nlade retroactive and makes it clear
that existing llbandoned property is subject to the act, but it
is not directed to thestatntc of limitations dealt with ill
§ 1515, which section contains no provision retrollctively re·
movin$!' the bar of the statute if· it had run before the effecth'e
date of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Jesse J. Frampton, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for declaratory rclief with respect to unpaid wage
claims on which the statute of limitations had run, but which
the State Controller claimed should be reported and paid to
him under thc Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property
Act. Judgment for plaintiff affirmcd.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, John F. Hassler and
Bonnie Lee Martin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Louis Lieber, Jr., Elmer J. Stone and William D. Craig
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-In 1959 the Legislature enacted the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act. (Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 1500-1527.) The act defines abandoned property
(§ § 1502-1508) and requires that its holder shall report
(§ 1510) and payor deliver it to the State Controller (§ 1512).
The statute of limitations is not a defense to such reporting
and payment or delivery (§ 1515), and the act applies to
property that was abandoned before it took effect (§ 1510,
subd. (g». It provides for notice to the owner by publication
and otherwise (§§ 1510, subd. (e), 1511). The owner may
appear at any time and daim the property from the Controller
after it has been delivered to him (§§ 1517-1520). Delivery
to the Controller is a defense to any action by the owner
against the holder. (§ 1513.) [1] The objectives of the
act are to protect unknown owners by locating them and restoring their property to them and to give the state rather than
the holders of unclaimed property the benefit of the use of
it, most of which experience shows will never be claimed.
After the act became effective, Douglas Aircraft Company
brought this action agaillst the Controller for declaratory
relief with respect to over $17,000 in ullpaid wage claims for
work done in California 011 which the statute of limitations had
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run before the effective date of the act. Douglas pcrforllis
government and private contracts. In the past it has crcditcd
unclaimed wages arising out of its contracts with the United
States to the United States, and the Coutroller makes no claim
that such wages should be reported or paid to him. Hc contends, however, that Douglas is required to report and pay
unclaimed wages arising out of work done on nongovernment
contracts to the extent that such wages are ascertainable from
the available records of Douglas (§ 1510, subd. (g» whethcr
or 110t the statute of limitatious had run on the claims for such
wages before the effective date of the act. The trial court held
that Douglas could 110t constitutionally be required to pay
wage claims to the Controller on which thc statute of limitations had run before the effective date of the act. The Controller appeals.
Douglas contends that the California Constitution precludes
the Legislature from abrogating the defense of the statute of
limitations after the statute has run. (See Chambers v. Gallagher, 177 Cal. 704, 708"709 [171 P. 931] ; Chambers v. Gibson,
178 Cal. 416, 417 [173 P. 752].) It further contends that even
if the generally applicable California rule were otherwise,
the due process clauses of the United States and California
Constitutions would preclude requiring it to report and pay
wage claims on whieh the limitations had run under the
circumstances of this case. In this respect it asserts that owing
to its reliance on the statute of limitations, it has not kept
records that would enable it, except at unreasonable expense,
to invoke the act's protection against double liability (§ 1513)
and contends that to expose it to such liability would deny
due process of law. (See Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341
U.S. 428, 442-443 [71 S.Ct. 822, 95 L.Ed. 1078]; Western
Union Tel. 00. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 [82 S.Ct. 199,
201,7 L.Ed.2d 139].)
The Controller contends that the rule of Chambers v.
Gallagher, 177 Cal. 704 [171 P. 931], that the defense of the
statute of Jimitations cannot be abrogated after the statute
has run should be limited to cases in which a prescriptive
title has been acquired or the liability was created by statute.
(See William Danzer Co. v. Gulf &- S. I. R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633,
637 [45 S.Ct. 612, 69 L.Ed. 1126].) With respect to contract
claims he urges that we adopt the rule of the United States
Supreme Court that the due process clause docs not prohibit
abrogating the defense of the statute of limitations after the
statute has run. (See Oampbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628
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[6 S.Ct. 209, 29 L.Ed. 483J ; Chase Securities Corp. v. Donald325 U.S. 304,315-316 [65 S.Ct. 1137,89 L.Ed. 1628J.) III.'
also contends that the act adequately protects Douglas from
the risk of double liability and that there are no special
circumstances in this case that would make the abrogation of
the defense of the statute of limitations a denial of due
process to Douglas.
We need not resolve these conflicting constitutional conten·
tions unless it clearly appears that the act provides for thl!
retroactive abrogation of the defense of the statute of limitations. Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides tllat
"No part of it is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."
(See also Di Genova v. State Board of Education, 57 Ca1.2d
167, 172-173 [18 Cal.Rptr. 369, 367 P.2d 865J ; Corning Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 488, 494 [20 Cal.Rptr.
621, 370 P.2d 325].) [2] The law governing changes in
the statute of limitations is summarized in EvelYll, Inc. v.
California Emp. Stab. Com., 48 Cal.2d 588, 592 [311 P.2d
500] : "The extension of the statutory period within which an
action must be brought is generally held to be valid if made before the cause of action is barred. (lV eldon v. Rogers, 151 Cal.
432 [90 P. 1062].) The party claiming to be adversely affected
is deemed to suffer no injury where he ,vas under an obligation
to pay before the period was lengthened. This is on the theory
that the legislation affects only the remedy and not a right.
(Mudd v. McColgan, 30 Cal.2d 463 [183 P.2d 10] ; Davis &
MdIillan v. Incl1tstr'ial Ace. Com., 198 Cal. 631 [246 P. 1046,46
A.L.R. 1095] ;31 Cal.Jur.2d 434.) An enlargement of the
limitation period by the Legislature has been held to be proper
in cases where the period had not run against a corporation for
additional franchise taxes (Edison Calif. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal.2d 472 [183 P.2d 16]), against an individual
for personal income taxes (Mudd v. jlcColgan, supra, 30 Cal.
2d 463), and against a judgment debtor (Weldon v. Rogers,
supra, 151 Cal. 432). [ 3 ] It has been held that unless the
statute expressly provides to the contrary any such enlargement applies to lI\atters pending but not already barred.
(Mudd v. McColgan, supra, 30 Cal.2d 463.)"
These rules afford warning to potential defendants that until
the statute of limitations has run it may be extended, whereas
after it has run, they may rely upon it in conducting their
affairs. The keeping of records, the maintenance of reserves,
and the commitment of funds may all be affected by surh
reliance, particularly in a well-organized enterprise that seeks
,~on,
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to operate efficiently. To defeat such reliance uoes more than
ucprive obligors of windfalls; it deprives them of the ability
to plan intelligently with respect to stale and apparently
abandoned claims. In view of these considerations, we believe
that in enacting the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Aet the Legislature would have expressed itself in unmistakable terms bad it rejected the establishcd rules goveruing the interpretation of statutes of limitations.
[ 4] Section 1515 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that" The expiration of any period of time specified by statute
or court order, during which an action or proceeding may be
commenced or enforced to obtain payment of a claim for
money or recovery of property, shall not pre"ent the money or
property from being presumed abandoned property, nor affect
any duty to file a report required by this chapter or to pay
or deliver abandoned property to the State Controller." This
section does not expressly provide that it shall be retroactive
or apply to claims that were already barred when it was
enacted. Accordingly, under section 3 of thc code and the
rules set forth in the Evelyn case it must be interpreted as
applying only to claims on which the statute of limitations
had not run on the effective date of the act. As to such claims,
and as to claims that will arise in the future, however, it
prevents the running of the statute applicable between the
holder and the owner from barring the duty of the holder
to report and pay to the Controller.
There is nothing in subdivisions (e) and (g) of section 1510
that eompels giving section 1515 a different interpretation.
Subdivision (e) provides: "If the holder of property presumed abandoned under this chapter knows the whereabouts
of the owner and if the owner's claim has not been barred by
the statute of limitations, the holder shall, before filing the
annual report, communicate with the o"\vner and take necessary
steps to prevent abandonment from being presumed. The
holder shall exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain the
whereabouts of the owner." This subsection deals with the
continuing situation in the administration of the act arising
from the fact that frequently the statute of limitations against
the owner wiU have run before the property is presumed abandoned and required to be reported. In such cases subdivision
(e) provides that there is nq duty to attempt to locate or
commuuicate with the owner. It does not provide, however,
that the bar of the statute is inapplicable against the Controller
if it had run before the effective date of the act.
)
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[5] Subdivisiou (~) of section 1510 provides: "The
initial report filed under this chapter shall include all items
of property held for another person which are ascertainable
from the available records of the holder, which items of property would have been presumed abandoned if this chapter
had been in effect at and after the time such property first
became payable, demandable or returnable; ... All items of
property, less proper charges and offsets, other than unclaimed
funds, which on January 1, 1949 appeared from the available
records to be held for another person and were thereafter
without notice to the owner or without prior approval of any
regulatory or licensing authority of this State transferred or
credited by the holder directly to capital or surplus or undivided profits shall be deemed to be subject to the provisions
of this chapter and shall be included within the initial report."
This section is expressly made retroactive and makes clear
that existing abandoned property is subject to the act. Such
property includes major categories as to which the statute of
limitations had not run on the effective date of the act, such
as obligations of financial institutions (Code Civ. Proc., § 348)
and trustees (Davcnport v. Davenport Foundation, 36 Ca1.2d
67, 75 [222 P.2d 11] ; State v. Standard Oil 00., 5 N.J. 281,
298-304 [74 A.2d 565]) and other obligations upon which the
statute does not begin to run until a demand has been made.
Thus, it is not neeessary to imply a provision removing the
bar of the statute after it had run to give effect to subdivision (g). That subdivision defines the property that must
be included in the initial report to the Controller, but it is
not directed to the statute of limitations, which is dealt with in
section 1515. Section 1515 contains no provision retroactively
removing the bar of the statute if it had run before the
effective date of the act. We cannot imply such a provision
in subdivision (g), for the rule against retroactive construction requires that "a statute should be given the least retroactive effect that its language reasonably permits." (Oorning
Hospital Dist. v. Superior Oourt, supra, 57 Ca1.2d 488, 494;
Interinsurance Exchange v. Ohio Oas. Ins. 00., ante, pp. 142,
149 [23 Cal.Rptr. 592, 373 P.2d 640].)
It is true tha~ the draftsmen of the uniform act indicated
that they believed the provision on which section 1515 is based
would apply retroactively (9A Uniform Laws Annotated pp.
267-269) and that similar provisions of other statutes have
been so interpreted. (Evans Products 00. v. Fry, 307 Mich.
506 [12 N.W.2d 448, 461] ; In TC Philadelphia Electric 00., 352
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Pa.457 [43 A.2cl116, 119] ; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Moore, 297 N.Y. 1 [74 N.E.2cl 24, 27].) The draftsmen, however, appear to have been preoccupied with the problem of
whether the statute of limitations applicable between the
holder and owner could be made inapplicable to the 'duty to
report and pay to the state even as to claims not barred when
the act took effect. It is also significant that in adopting the
uniform act the Legislature omitted the provision that it
should be construed "to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it." (Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property
Act, § 29, 9A Uniform Laws Annotated, p. 274.) Although
the committee report recommending adoption of the uniform
act in California referred to the provision making the statute
of limitations inapplicable against the state, it did not state
that the provision would apply retroactively to claims that
were already barred when the statute took effect. (Report of
the Escheat Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary,
Abandoned Property-State Acquisition and Recovery by
Rightful Owner, 20 Assembly Interim Committee Reports
1957-1959, No.4, p. 15.) Accordingly, the California rule
of construction against retroactivity is applicable here.
The jUdgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J.,
and Tobriner, J., ~oncurred.

